In the Slaughter-House Cases, for example, the Court ruled that most fundamental rights remained subject to the control of the sovereign states.
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The very next year the Court held in Minor v. Happersett that the Constitution did not grant women of any color the right to vote. 12 Thus, the Supreme Court continued to use states' sovereignty, even after the Civil War, to avoid granting all Americans the right to vote. White Americans' antipathy toward enfranchising both blacks (slave or free) and the descendants of blacks (slave or free) is arguably one of the primary reasons the right to vote is still not recognized today as one of the privileges of both national and state citizenship for all Americans.
The Fifteenth Amendment, which had been adopted in 1870, was the product of Congress's realization that the states, North as well as South, were in no mood to enfranchise blacks. The Reconstruction Republicans had to settle for prohibiting state laws that 1) denied or abridged the right to vote on account of race, and 2) gave "The Congress" the "power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
13 This was the ground on which a century later Congress would build the Voting Rights Act of 1965, exercising its explicit power under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment "to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." 14 The Supreme Court's Shelby County decision does not say that Congress abused its constitutional enforcement power in enacting Section 4. 15 Instead, the Shelby County majority revives the ghost of Dred Scott by ruling that Congress's enforcement power cannot be exercised in a way that violates the "equal sovereignty" of the former Confederate states.
The surest and most immediate way to repudiate the racial insult inflicted by the equal sovereignty ruling of Shelby County would be a social movement to push Congress to act. 16 Such an effort, relying explicitly on 11 See 83 U.S. 36, 62 (1873). 12 See 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874) . 13 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § § 1-2. ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude . . . . The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.").
14 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. See also Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406, 412 (2008) ("The VRA reflected Congress' determination that 'sterner and more elaborate measures' were needed to counteract these formidable hindrances. Sections 4 and 5 impose the most stringent of the Act's remedies. Under § 4(b), as amended, a State or political subdivision is a so-called 'covered jurisdiction' if, on one of three specified coverage dates: (1) it maintained a literacy requirement or other 'test or device' as a prerequisite to voting, and (2) fewer than 50% of its voting-age citizens were registered to vote or voted in that year's Presidential election. Section 4(a) suspends the operation of all such 'test[s] or device[s]' in covered jurisdictions. Section 5 requires covered jurisdictions to obtain what has come to be known as 'preclearance' from the District Court for the District of Columbia or the DOJ before 'enact [ing] or seek[ing] to administer' any alteration of their practices or procedures affecting voting.") (citations omitted). 15 See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) . 16 Sidney Tarrow defines a social movement as "collective challenges [to elites, authorities, other groups or cultural codes by people with] common purposes and solidarity, in sustained interactions with elites, opponents and authorities." SYDNEY G. TARROW, POWER IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 9 (1994). In the case of the the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause, would seek to restore Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act to exactly as it was when amended and re-enacted by Congress in 2006 . 17 Such an effort might ultimately gain real traction among legal academics, as more and more scholars conclude that the Supreme Court misinterpreted the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause-both in the Slaughter-House Cases (of the nineteenth century) and now in Shelby County (of the twenty-first century). 18 There is, in fact, a growing "academic consensus [that] Slaughter-House was wrong-blatantly, maliciously, egregiously. (Pick your adverb.)" 19 Sadly, the disinterment of Dred Scott appears not to be a simple oversight. Revitalizing the equal sovereignty principle-without acknowledging its racially discriminatory pedigree-arguably suggests that the Supreme Court majority is attempting to head off congressional reconsideration of the right to vote as one of the fundamental privileges and immunities endowed by the Constitution on every person who becomes a citizen of the United States. Such action by Congress-using its enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment-could assure African Americans, as well as all whites, Latinos, and other Americans, that threats to their full and free exercise of the franchise, and to their status as equal citizens, can be overcome through national legislation. But unless a social movement of Voting Rights Act, a social movement would likely be a collective challenge to the Congress through the cross-racial mobilization by people with a sense of solidarity who are willing to engage in sustained interactions with elites, opponents, and authorities in order to push for an updated version of the Voting Rights Act. 17 The Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, passed with a vote in the Senate of 98-0 and in the House of Representatives of 390-33, a vote that included wide support from both Democrats and Republicans. Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006) . Indeed, the Judiciary Committee Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., a Republican, was one of the Act's chief sponsors.
academics, lawyers, and an aroused people emerges to push Congress to recover the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause, that Clause-which holds the promise of a fundamental right to vote-shall remain virtually a dead letter in constitutional jurisprudence. 20 This article proceeds as follows. First, we describe the majority and dissenting opinions in Shelby County v. Holder. Then we examine the roots of Chief Justice Roberts's "equal sovereignty" principle in Dred Scott v. Sandford to show how the original Privileges and Immunities Clause made it necessary for the Supreme Court to deny the descendants of African slaves citizenship rights in order to protect the Southern states. A review of the Slaughter-House Cases and Minor v. Happersett follows to show how the Supreme Court had to gut the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause to preserve states' control of voting rights and to prevent blacks as United States citizens from being protected by a constitutional right to vote. The final sections of this article summarize the familiar history of black disfranchisement by the former Confederate states, Congress's eventual use of anti-discrimination provisions in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to combat voting discrimination, and how the recent Shelby County decision forces Congress to consider restoring its own power under the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause to reject the racially tainted judicial doctrine of states' equal sovereignty and to enforce a national right to vote for all American citizens.
I. SHELBY COUNTY V. HOLDER
Chief Justice Roberts's opinion for the Court's majority in Shelby County holds that Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional. But that holding is not based on a judicial claim that Congress, in enacting the 2006 Voting Rights Act, exceeded its enforcement powers under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. It is not based on a violation of any specific provision of the Constitution at all. Instead, the majority holds that Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional because, by requiring only some of the states to obtain federal preclearance before implementing changes to their policies and practices affecting voting, it violates not a Constitutional imperative but a mere "tradition": "our historic tradition that all the States enjoy equal sovereignty." The coverage formula in Section 4 relied on the use of voting tests and low voter registration and turnout data in 1965 to target the states with a long history of "actual voting discrimination," primarily the former Confederate states that after Reconstruction segregated and disfranchised their black citizens. 22 No one questions that, throughout their history, the Southern states did not want blacks to vote. Nevertheless, the Shelby County majority held that the Section 4 formula violates the equal sovereignty principle if, "in light of current conditions," the racial disparities in registration and turnout no longer distinguish the covered states from other states. 23 Justice Ginsburg's powerful dissent points out that invoking the notion of states' equal sovereignty to strike down this exercise of Congress's express power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment sub silentio overrules South Carolina v. Katzenbach, which rejected the same equal sovereignty argument in 1966. 24 She identifies the two most relevant questions that should have been answered in Shelby County: 1) did Congress have the power to reauthorize the Voting Rights Act in 2006, and 2) did Congress act "rationally" when doing so? For Justice Ginsburg, the answer to both questions is an easy yes. More importantly, she declares, the Voting Rights Act has worked where it is supposed to work. "Congress approached the 2006 reauthorization of the VRA with great care and seriousness," Ginsburg says. "The same cannot be said of the Court's opinion today." 25 "Hubris," Justice Ginsburg concludes, "is a fit word for today's demolition of the VRA."
26 Indeed, "throwing out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop discriminatory changes is like states to the union, or border disputes stemming from the terms of state admission. See infra note 137. The only cases prior to Shelby County that had applied this principle to block federal legislation because it impacted existing states differently were Dred Scott and Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842). In Prigg, another infamous case, the Court held as unconstitutional a Pennsylvania law that criminalized the taking of blacks from the state to be placed or sold into slavery. 41 U.S. at 625. Roberts cited neither Dred Scott nor Prigg in his decisions in Northwest Austin and Shelby County.
22 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625 (quoting S. Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 330 (1966)). 23 Id. at 2627. 24 Id. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Katzenbach, which first upheld the Voting Rights Act and also expressly defined the boundaries of the equal sovereignty principle, should have governed Shelby County. South Carolina had challenged the then-new statute under many theories, including that preclearance "violates the principle of the equality of States." Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 323. The Court only needed a single sentence to roundly reject this argument: "The doctrine of the equality of States, invoked by South Carolina, does not bar this approach, for that doctrine applied only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the Union, and not to the remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared." Id. at 328-29 (emphasis added). After Katzenbach, it could not have been clearer that the equal sovereignty principle was limited exclusively to the admission of new states, and did not apply when Congress wielded its authority to protect the right to vote under the Fifteenth Amendments, as it did with the Voting Rights Act and its reauthorizations. 25 Therefore, Taney said, blacks could not be "citizens" within the meaning of the Constitution, because the Founders intended that a descendant of African slaves could never become a "constituent member" of the "'people of the United States' . . . who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the Government through their representatives." 30 Thus the free State of Illinois could not confer the status of "citizen" on Dred Scott and his family and thereby make them citizens of either Missouri or the United States.
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The equal sovereignty principle Chief Justice Taney elaborated in Dred Scott was an attempt to settle once and for all the great question of whether Congress had the power to prohibit slavery in new states created after the original thirteen states ratified the Constitution. This issue threatened to stalemate the Constitutional Convention in 1787, and its resolution was postponed by a statutory compromise. Delegates temporarily adjourned the Philadelphia Convention and rushed to New York to take their seats in the Continental Congress, where they enacted the famous Northwest Ordinance of 1787. 32 The Northwest Ordinance explicitly prohibited slavery in the territories west of the Allegheny Mountains and north of the Ohio River, but was silent about slavery in Southern states' western territories. New states to be created out of the Northwest Territory would be admitted on an "equal footing" with the original states, the Ordinance provided, on condition that 27 Id. at 2650. 28 40 which shifted the debate between pro-slavery and anti-slavery forces to the question of whether free blacks could ever be citizens of the United States. 41 The position of the Southern states was that no black person, slave or free, could be a "citizen" within the meaning of the Constitution because, as 33 Id. at 155. 34 Id. at 158 ("Adoption of the Northwest Ordinance during the Convention was a planned, coordinated action that resolved a stalemate that had continued for three years in the Continental Congress by dividing the entire western territory of the United States into two territorial areas: one in which slavery was prohibited and another in which slavery's fate was nominally left to future decisions by Congress."). 35 Id. at 155-56. 36 Id. at 211-12. 37 See id. at 225-66. 38 See supra note 10 (distinguishing the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause from the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause).
39 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 40 Missouri Compromise, Res. of Mar. 2, 1821, 3 Stat. 645. Congress accepted the first Missouri constitution even though it contained a provision that barred free blacks from entering the state. The compromise prohibited that provision from being construed to exclude "any citizen, of either of the states in this Union . . . from the enjoyment of any of the privileges and immunities to which such citizen is entitled under the constitution of the United States." 41 Hamburger, supra note 18, at 70.
the Kentucky Supreme Court held, blacks were "a degraded race . . . [and] under the constitution and laws of the United States, they can not become citizens of the Unites States." 42 To drive home the danger of considering free blacks to be citizens, the Southern states defined broadly the "privileges and immunities" guaranteed to citizens of the United States by Article IV, Section 2, to embrace all "fundamental" rights, including the right to vote, as Justice Bushrod Washington had said in Corfield v. Coryell. 43 This fundamental rights strategy had its desired effect (i.e. it helped turn many Northern whites against black citizenship), because negro suffrage was unpopular in the Northern states and in the new federal territories, as well as in the South. 44 So, to make black citizenship more palatable in the North, antislavery advocates defined the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause narrowly, so as not to include the right to vote. Perversely, the champions of free blacks' status as citizens of the United States found it necessary to read the right to vote out of the Constitution.
The debate over whether blacks could be citizens of the United States was brought to a head in Dred Scott. The pro-slavery majority of the Court held that the descendants of slaves could never be citizens within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States and based this decision on the openly racist equal sovereignty argument of the Southern states. 45 Dred Scott had been taken by his "owner" out of Missouri to reside in the free state of Illinois and in Wisconsin territory, where slavery was forbidden. Then they returned to the slave state of Missouri. The Privileges As a practical illustration of the principle, we may refer to the legislation of the free States in abolishing slavery, and prohibiting its introduction into their territories. Confessedly, except as restrained by the Federal Constitution, they exercised, and rightfully, complete and absolute power over the subject. Upon what principle, then, can it be denied to the State of Missouri? The power flows from the sovereign character of the States of the Union; sovereign, not merely as respects the Federal Government -except as they have consented to its limitation -but sovereign as respects each other. 60 U.S. at 459 (Wayne, J., concurring) (emphasis added). "This perfect equality and entire independence of all distinct States is a fundamental principle of public law." 60 U.S. at 484 (Daniel, J., concurring). "'The Declaration of Independence was not,' says Justice Chase, 'a declaration that the United Colonies jointly, in a collective capacity, were independent States, . . . but that each of them was a sovereign and independent State; that is, that each of them had a right to govern itself by its own authority and its own laws, without any control from any other power on earth.'" 60 U.S. at 502 (Campbell, J., concurring) (citations omitted). [Vol. 8 and Immunities Clause says that whatever rights of citizenship a person enjoys in one state must be respected by "the several States."
46 So if Dred Scott had been a "citizen" of Illinois and the Wisconsin territory, didn't the Privileges and Immunities Clause make him a "citizen" of Missouri as well?
Taney sought to avoid such a result, which would have been intolerable to the slave states, by distinguishing ordinary state citizenship from "citizen" within the meaning of the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause. He said:
In discussing this question, we must not confound the rights of citizenship which a State may confer within its own limits, and the rights of citizenship as a member of the Union. It does not by any means follow, because he has all the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State, that he must be a citizen of the United States. He may have all of the rights and privileges of the citizen of a State, and yet not be entitled to the rights and privileges of a citizen in any other State.
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To be a "member of the Union" meant being a "citizen of the United States." And this constitutional status of citizen, according to Taney's rigidly originalist theory, is limited to those persons who at the founding "formed the sovereignty and framed the Constitution."
48 He held that "[t]he duty of the court is, to interpret the instrument they have framed, with the best lights we can obtain on the subject, and to administer it as we find it, according to its true intent and meaning when it was adopted." 49 Thus Chief Justice Taney sought to resolve the great antebellum question about the meaning of "citizens" in the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause by insisting that in the 1787 Constitution "citizen" was synonymous with the "people" in "We the people" upon whose sovereignty the Constitution stands. 50 And, he contended, if citizen and sovereign people were the same thing, the Founders clearly did not intend to include slaves and their descendants in the definition of either term. 51 Persons of African heritage "were at that time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them." 52 This meant, according to Taney, that even free blacks "were not intended to be included . . . under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which 46 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 47 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 405. 48 Id. 49 Id. 50 Id. at 404. 51 Id. 52 Id. at 404-05 (emphasis added).
[Article IV, Section 2 of] that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States." 53 The "large slaveholding states," Taney said, would never have agreed to the 1787 Constitution if it had given Congress the power to make blacks members of the sovereign people. 54 So, in Taney's view, when a state gave free black persons any rights enjoyed by its white citizens, those were merely the only rights and privileges that the sovereign people of that state "might choose to grant them." It gave the Africans and their descendants no share of the sovereignty of the state and no share of the derivative sovereignty of the United States.
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Native Americans who renounced their tribal sovereignty and immigrants from foreign countries could be naturalized as provided by Congress and "become citizens of a State, and of the United States . . . entitled to all the rights and privileges" provided by Article IV, because they came to full American citizenship as free peoples.
56 By contrast, said Taney, "a perpetual and impassable barrier was intended to be erected between the white race and the one which they had reduced to slavery," and, regardless of whether the negro was slave or free, this permanent exclusion from the sovereign people of the United States, "this stigma, of the deepest degradation, was fixed upon the whole race." 57 Justice Curtis's dissent in Dred Scott repeated the anti-slavery argument that free blacks could be citizens under Article IV, Section 2, without taking the position, unpopular with whites in both North and South, that black suffrage was one of the privileges and immunities of citizenship. He wrote, "though . . . I do not think the enjoyment of the elective franchise essential to citizenship, there can be no doubt it is one of the chiefest attributes of citizenship under the American Constitutions; and the just and constitutional possession of this right is decisive evidence of citizenship." 58 Chief Justice Taney repudiated Justice Curtis's narrow definition of the privileges and immunities of citizenship by repeating the in terrorem pro-slavery interpretation of the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause. 59 Taney pointed to the plain text and said Justice Curtis's crabbed reading of Article IV, Section 2 "overlooks the language of the provision."
60 He acknowledged the obvious point that, in 1857, women, minors, and males without property "cannot 53 Id. at 404. 54 Id. at 416-17. 55 See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW, AND POLITICS: THE DRED SCOTT CASE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 187 (1981) ("Here we are introduced to a fundamental assumption underlying Taney's argument, summed up in the words, 'whether emancipated or not.' All blacks, according to his view, stood on the same ground. Emancipation made no difference. The status of the free Negro was fixed forever by the fact that he or his ancestors had once been enslaved.").
56 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404. 57 Id. at 409 (emphasis added). 58 Id. at 581 (Curtis. J., dissenting) (emphasis added Taney then dismissed the distinction anti-slavery advocates made between political rights and civil rights ("mere rights of person"). 64 He agreed that the Privileges and Immunities Clause protected only the civil rights of "citizens of a State who are temporarily in another State without taking up their residence there," not the political rights of voting and holding office. 65 "For a citizen of one State has no right to participate in the government of another."
66 But it would be intolerable and contrary to the founders' intentions to bestow even civil rights on black visitors to slave states, said Taney. 67 And here was the clincher: if the term "citizens" under the Privileges and Immunities Clause was construed to include blacks, when a black resident of a free state moved his domicile to another state, he would be clothed by the Constitution "with all the privileges and immunities which belong to citizens of the State," 68 including, by clear implication, the right to vote. " [T] hey would hold these privileges and immunities under the paramount authority of the Federal Government, and its courts would be bound to maintain and enforce them, the Constitution and laws of the State to the contrary notwithstanding." 69 In other words, according to Taney, acknowledging the citizenship of free blacks under the Constitution would be an intolerable violation of states' rights to equal sovereignty.
III. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The Dred Scott decision was one of the leading causes of both the Civil War 70 and the post-War adoption of the Citizenship and Privileges or Immu- 61 Id. 62 Id. 63 Id. 64 Id. 65 Id. 66 Id. 67 See id. at 422-23. 68 Id. at 423 (emphasis added). 69 Id. 70 Don Fehrenbacher rejected the suggestion that the Dred Scott decision was the sine qua non of the Civil War. "Yet it was a conspicuous and perhaps integral part of a configuration of events and conditions that did produce enough changes of allegiance to make a political revolution and enough intensity of feeling to make that revolution violent." FEHRENBACHER, supra note 55, at 294.
nities Clauses in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 71 In the debates leading up to passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, "controversy centered on Negro suffrage as a vital element in a Reconstruction settlement with the South." 72 The Radical Republicans who led the 39th Congress that opened in December 1865 were driven by "the utopian vision of a nation whose citizens enjoyed equality of civil and political rights, secured by a powerful and beneficent national state." 73 Committed champions of the freedmen were able to get Congress to enfranchise blacks by statute in the District of Columbia and in the federal territories, and to require the former Confederate states to include black suffrage in their state constitutions as a condition for readmission to Congress. 74 But the 1867 state elections convinced the ruling Republicans that federal imposition of black suffrage would be unacceptable to the Northern states, in many of which referenda on granting blacks the right to vote had been defeated. 75 As Professor Amar politely puts it, "[i]n 1866, the nation was not ready for a rule that every state, in the North as well as the South, must allow blacks to vote equally."
76 So the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment compromised by including in Section 2 a clause that would reduce representation in Congress for any state that denied the right to vote to "any of the male inhabitants of such State."
77 This provision tacitly acknowledged that some states, even under the threat of such penalty, would continue denying their black citizens the vote.
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The insertion of the word "male" in Section 2 was an intentional snub towards the cause of women's suffrage. "Black suffrage and women's suffrage were closely linked issues everywhere in the 1860s and in the South well into the twentieth century . . . ." 79 The suffragists had hitched their wagon to the abolitionist movement, and after the Civil War it was women who urged the governing Republicans to guarantee universal, federally enforceable voting rights. Elizabeth Cady Stanton rejected the principle that the franchise was a "gift of society" along with any suggestion that "women 71 Passage of the Fifteenth Amendment "decisively severed" the causes of blacks' and women's suffrage. 92 The chances were missed for a national right to vote, enforceable by Congress and providing effective protection for all American citizens, when the 1867 Congress punted on the new Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause. The constitutional tort that the Fifteenth Amendment established left both black citizens and the federal government with the difficult task of proving that state and local governments were guilty of racial discrimination. Viewed together, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments left much of the constitutional insult the Dred Scott Court had directed at African Americans still operative. Blacks were now citizens, but their citizen status did not unequivocally make them members of the sovereign people, of the constitutional family of the United States. The right to vote, "the just and constitutional possession [of which]," Justice Curtis had said, "is decisive evidence of citizenship," 93 was still not secure. 86 See GILLETTE, supra note 72, at 41-45. 87 Id. at 84-85. 88 During debates over the Fifteenth Amendment when advocates of the freedmen argued that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment already gave Congress the power to ban racial discrimination in voting, they were rebuffed with the argument that the antebellum interpretation of the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause still applied, leaving control of the franchise to the states. See Green, supra note 18, at 272-73. 89 GILLETTE, supra note 72, at 72. 90 Id. at 77 ("The Fifteenth Amendment had a limited object -first, to enfranchise the northern Negro, and second, to protect the southern Negro against disfranchisement, and it was chiefly the work of moderates in Congress. It offered too little to southern Republicans, who wanted greater protection of Negro voting and a mild guarantee of Negro officeholding; it offered even less to the many veteran antislavery northern Republicans who sought, in addition to firmer guarantees for southern Negroes, general suffrage reform and even national control of suffrage."). 91 
V. THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES
African Americans would be condemned to at least another century of exclusion from the sovereign people by the Supreme Court, which seized on Congress's missed opportunity to specify in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment the privileges and immunities of United States citizenship. In the Slaughter-House Cases, 94 the Court tried to close the door on future congressional reconsideration of what rights are to be included among the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizenship by defining those rights judicially. The irony of how the Court turned this constitutional trick is shameful.
The plaintiffs in the Slaughter-House Cases were white butchers who claimed, inter alia, that New Orleans gave one slaughterhouse company a monopoly that violated other butchers' rights to free labor protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause. The butchers were represented by none other than John Archibald Campbell of Alabama, who had been one of the concurring Justices in Dred Scott. 95 The privileges and immunities of national citizenship, Campbell argued, included "the personal and civil rights which usage, tradition, the habits of society, written law, and the common sentiments of people have recognized as forming the basis of the institutions of the country." 96 This was the broad definition of privileges and immunities in the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause that Campbell and his pro-slavery colleagues had invoked to defeat black citizenship. But, now, political rights were conspicuously absent from Campbell's definition.
Writing for the Court's majority, Justice Miller, an anti-slavery founder of the Iowa Republican Party, 97 could have called in the pro-slavery debt and given the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause the broad meaning Taney had given it, including the right to vote. But in 1873 the retreat from Reconstruction was in full swing, the movement to reunite Northern and Southern whites had begun, and even many Republicans were joining growing white hostility toward black voters and officeholders. (1867)). They included the citizen's right "to come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon that government, to transact any business he may have with it, to seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions. He has the right of free access to its seaports, through which all operations of foreign commerce are conducted, to the subtreasuries, land offices, and courts of justice in the several States." Id. 103 108 But Justice Swayne acknowledged that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had yielded to popular opposition to black suffrage and had not intended to include the right to vote among the privileges or immunities of national citizenship that were immediately enforceable. Happersett presented the question of whether the Privileges or Immunities Clause extended the franchise to women. 110 The case was brought by suffragists seeking a broad interpretation of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a judicial way to defeat the demeaning insertion of "male" in Section 2. Susan B. Anthony put the issue this way:
If we once establish the false principle, that United States citizenship does not carry with it the right to vote in every State in this Union, there is no end to the petty freaks and cunning devices that will be resorted to, to exclude one and another class of citizens from the right of suffrage.
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Unfortunately, this was exactly what the Justices in Minor v. Happersett were up to. They "were self-consciously laying the legal groundwork for decisions that would limit the ability of the federal government to prevent racial discrimination in the South as well as discrimination against workers and immigrants in the North." 112 So, without explicitly mentioning Dred Scott, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Dred Scott holding that, like the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article IV, the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause must be discerned by identifying those who were allowed to vote when the Constitution was adopted in 1787. 113 The Court even quoted the 1790 naturalization statute passed by Congress, which restricted citizenship to "a free white person." 114 117 Not surprisingly, then, blacks in the South would remain disfranchised until years after Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 113 See Minor, 88 U.S. at 166. 114 Id. at 168. 115 Id. at 171. 116 Id. at 175. Minor v. Happersett also held that the Article IV constitutional guarantee to every state of a "republican form of government" was no help to women (or blacks):
The guaranty necessarily implies a duty on the part of the States themselves to provide such a government. All the States had governments when the Constitution was adopted. In all the people participated to some extent, through their representatives elected in the manner specially provided. These governments the Constitution did not change. They were accepted precisely as they were, and it is, therefore, to be presumed that they were such as it was the duty of the States to provide. Thus we have unmistakable evidence of what was republican in form, within the meaning of that term as employed in the Constitution. 118 but it makes no mention at all of Dred Scott, the Slaughter-House Cases, or Minor v. Happersett. Surely the Court had to be aware of the racially discriminatory origins of its "equal sovereignty" doctrine and the question the Slaughter-House Cases left unresolved about whether the descendants of slaves, who had been made citizens by Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, are also members of the sovereign people of their states and of the United States. 119 The constitutional context in which the Shelby County majority located its equal sovereignty principle brings to mind Chief Justice Taney's view that African Americans are still mere subjects of the Constitution, not its authors. Not full members of the sovereign people, black Americans remain merely recipients of those rights and privileges the sovereign constitutional family chooses to give them.
Id
This constitutionally subordinate status for African Americans had long been the view of the vast majority of white Southerners through most of the twentieth century. 120 States like Alabama officially embraced Jim Crow and benefitted from the disfranchisement that followed the Slaughter-House decision and the "redemption" of the former Confederate states from "black rule." 121 In 1903, at the turn of the twentieth century, Justice Holmes informed black Alabamians, who had been disfranchised by that state's (still in force today) 1901 constitution, that "relief from a great political wrong, if done, as alleged, by the people of a state and the state itself, must be given by them or by the legislative and political department of the government of Six decades later, the Voting Rights Act became the modern response to Justice Holmes's admonition. African Americans finally obtained some relief from the political department of the United States, after many were brutally beaten by Alabama police when they attempted to march across the Edmund Pettus Bridge in Selma, Alabama. Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 slowly led to the re-enfranchisement of Southern blacks and to the removal of many election structures that diluted their voting strength.
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The Supreme Court, however, slowed that progress by holding that the Voting Rights Act extended no rights beyond those guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment, 124 and, in City of Mobile v. Bolden, that states were still free to retain old election schemes that denied black voters an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice, unless those voters could prove that the state laws were enacted for an invidious purpose. 125 Congress countered Bolden by including in the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act a "results" standard for Section 2.
126 Then the Court narrowed the reach of Section 5 by ruling that it did not prohibit Alabama from denying equal powers to officials who had been elected by African Americans. 127 The voting rights of black Etowah County citizens were not affected, the Court held, when white commissioners voted to give themselves continuing control over the road and bridge shops in their respective districts, while assigning Law-[Vol. 8 rence C. "Coach" Presley, the sole black commissioner, the duty of supervising maintenance at the courthouse. 128 Now, less than seven years after the VRA's reauthorization, the Shelby County decision has struck down a core provision of the first voting rights act in which African Americans elected to Congress from all the former slaveholding states had participated. 129 This direct involvement by Southern black members of Congress arguably gave special constitutional stature to the 2006 Voting Rights Act. The special constitutional stature we speak of here includes-but goes beyond-the heightened status of the Voting Rights Act emphasized by Bruce Ackerman 130 and Jack Balkin. 131 The Voting Rights Act also qualifies as what two scholars call a "super-statute," that is, one of the statutes that "penetrate public normative and institutional culture in a deep way" 132 and that might be considered "quasi-constitutional." 133 But, as this article argues, it is the descendants of slaves who have borne the burden of exclusion from full membership in the sovereign people, and, short of an Article V constitutional amendment, there is no other law better suited than the Voting Rights Act through which African Americans can be recognized as authors, not merely subjects, of the fundamental law of American democracy. For the first time, in 2006, the descendants of slaves, through their representatives, could be seen acting as constituent members of the sovereign people of the United States when they succeeded in exercising Congress's enforcement powers under the Reconstruction Amendments. 136 Thus, it appears that African Americans still are not recognized by their elected officials to be members of Alabama's sovereign people. Such circumstances were of no consequence for the Shelby County majority. None of the case authorities cited in Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion dealt with the fundamental rights of American citizenship. 137 His opinion demonstrates remarkable insensitivity to the true history of Shelby County's "equal sovereignty" principle, which shows that the ruling declaring Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional is based on the jurisprudence of slavery. There is some shameful irony in Chief Justice Roberts's reliance on the equal sovereignty holding in this last case. The Pollard opinion traces the terms of Alabama's admission to the Union in 1819 back to the 1798 act of Congress establishing the Mississippi Territory and to the 1802 deed of cession to the federal government by Georgia of its western territories, which included most of Alabama. Id. at 222, 226. As the Pollard Court noted, Congress granted western territories ceded by Georgia all the rights and privileges of the 1787 Northwest Ordinance, "that part of it excepted which prohibited slavery. . . ." Id. at 226.
VIII. HOW CONGRESS SHOULD RESPOND
The amicus brief for the Alabama Legislative Black Caucus commented on this historical background by noting that "Chief Justice John Marshall approved sub silentio Congress' authority to extend slavery into" the territory that would become the State of Alabama. See Brief of the Alabama Legislative Black Caucus, supra note 136 at 7-9. Justice Marshall reasoned that "[t]his important and dangerous contest has been compromised, and the compromise is not now to be disturbed." Id. (citing Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 142 (1810)). [Vol. 8 is what now can African Americans (with their Latino, Asian American, Native American, and white allies) do to achieve full membership as citizens, i.e., citizens with equal access to the status and power held by the sovereign people of the states and the United States. This question transcends the enactment of new protections from discrimination in the exercise of their right to vote or the enforcement of remaining anti-discrimination protections. What can be done short of replacing the entire 1787 Constitution and the stigma of slavery it placed in the way of full citizenship for descendants of the freedmen?
The obvious starting place is revisiting the historical constitutional question on which Chief Justice Roberts's "equal sovereignty" doctrine is based. The question the Shelby County decision forces us to confront is how today we should define the privileges and immunities of United States citizenship, a task of definition that caused the Court in Dred Scott to exclude the descendants of slaves from the term "citizens" in Article IV, Section 2. It caused the Reconstruction Congress to concede that blacks' voting rights were too unpopular to be enforced under the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause. And it caused the Supreme Court to neuter the Privileges or Immunities Clause by refusing to recognize the fundamental rights of national citizenship. The only right thing to do, we contend, is to give "the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" their plain meaning. There can be no doubt that prevailing policies of racial and gender discrimination were the only reasons that plain meaning was not embraced in the nineteenth century.
No one today could dispute that, in Jed Rubenfeld's words, the right to vote is "the quintessential right of citizenship."
138 Akhil Reed Amar agrees that, "as a matter of ordinary language and plain meaning, the right to vote certainly can be understood as a 'privilege.'" 139 He points out that voting rights textually fit more logically under the Privileges or Immunities Clause than under the Equal Protection Clause, which "is aimed at persons, not citizens, and was understood by all as paradigmatically focused on the rights of (nonvoting) aliens-a rather awkward text for voting rights. Professor Rubenfeld agrees "that the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not see voting as a privilege or immunity of citizenship." 144 But he does not accept Professor Amar's argument "that later interpreters are somehow semantically barred from ruling that voting is a privilege or immunity of citizenship." 145 Rubenfeld contends that the Reconstruction framers "committed themselves and the nation to more than they bargained for," and that when we now understand that their intentions were "logically [and] 147 Professor Amar responds with this summation of his position: "Where I think we disagree is how enactment history comes into the picture, and how much we should trust, and defer to, judicial doctrine that breaks free from that history." 148 We think Professor Rubenfeld's view is the correct one, and our question to Professor Amar is how can Americans today, understanding the "stigma, of the deepest degradation" 149 on the descendants of slaves and the subjugation of women which drove the enactment history of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, leave us any choice but to break free from the preand post-Civil War invidious disregard of the plain meaning of the Amendment's words? But we also take issue with Professor Amar's assumption that this is primarily a problem for judicial doctrine. The complex question whether the descendants of American slaves are now full partners in constitutional democracy cannot be decided by judicial fiat. " [T] he privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids states to "abridge" clearly begin with the democratic rights of national citizenship. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress, not the Supreme Court, the power to determine what federal stat-[Vol. 8 utes are "appropriate" to "enforce" those democratic rights. 150 Congress' exercise of its long dormant power to enforce the Privileges or Immunities Clause in response to the Shelby County decision would not make that Clause "a dormant volcano" that invites judges "to write their personal views of appropriate public policy into the Constitution," a topic about which Judge Wilkinson has warned us. 151 To the contrary, it would affirm the constitutional policy that the rights of national citizenship are to be determined in the first instance by the political branch of the federal government, 152 and that the Court exceeded its authority by attempting to reintroduce an unwritten and racially tainted doctrine of states' "equal sovereignty."
The textually unjustified, discriminatorily based Supreme Court decisions in the Slaughter-House Cases and Minor v. Happersett cannot be interposed today as an objection to Congress's exercise of its enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to interpret the Privileges or Immunities Clause as giving it the responsibility to enact laws that protect the right to vote of citizens of the United States. In his opinion for the Court in City of Boerne v. Flores, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that "[w]hen Congress acts within its sphere of power and responsibilities, it has not just the right but the duty to make its own informed judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution. 154 and "reflect[ed] a lack of proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved."
Ordinary Americans today broadly claim the rights to vote and to vote equally, believe that these rights are theirs, and embody these beliefs in routine practices that are nearly universally celebrated. These rights have thus become Ninth Amendment rights retained by the people and elements of proper republican government-even if they were not so when the republican-government clause and the Ninth Amendment were written. Professors Amar and Karlan may be correct on all these points. But congressional invocation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause would clothe all these textual and popular sources of the right to vote in the armor of national citizenship and sovereign peoplehood. "Only the [Vol. 8 by election or appointment, the methods of election, the times and places of elections, and related matters now subject to state control. But Congress also could exercise its Privileges or Immunities authority to monitor the voting practices and procedures of all states, or of particular states, to ensure their fairness in general, not simply whether they discriminate against classes of persons. 166 Any "equal sovereignty" argument would be irrelevant. Congress would not need to demonstrate that one state discriminates more than another before requiring it to obtain federal preclearance for changes in its voting policies and practices. States could be required to comply with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act based on a congressional determination, for example, that structural vestiges of official white supremacy persist, like Alabama's 1901 Constitution, or that racially polarized voting patterns threaten the ability of ethnic or political minorities to participate fairly and effectively in the political process. 167 We would argue that one of the first such statutes aimed at rehabilitating the Privileges or Immunities Clause should be re-enactment of Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act-as it was enacted in 2006. This would be a clear determination by Congress that the "equal sovereignty" basis of the Supreme Court's decision in Shelby County v. Holder was constitutionally ultra vires, and that the equal status of all citizens of the United States outweighs any claims by the states of their equal sovereignty.
IX. CONCLUSION
A constitutional right to vote has been hiding in plain sight for a century and a half, imprisoned by the hostility to blacks' and women's suffrage that caused the Supreme Court to repudiate the plain meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause and to surrender the democratic rights of United States citizens to states' claims of equal sovereignty. The Court's recent Shelby County decision forces Congress to revisit the vestiges of slavery that underlie the "equal sovereignty" claim that cannot be found in the text of the Constitution and to restore the national right to vote that has always resided in the plain words of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. It is up to us, the American people, to demand that Congress carry out its constitutional duty in ways that unmistakably acknowledge that the descendants of slaves are full and equal members of the sovereign people and that establish a nationwide regime of election laws capable of protecting uniformly the voting rights of all American citizens.
